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Disentangling the Performance and Entrenchment
Effect of Family Shareholding:
A Study of Indian Corporate Governance*

Manoranjan Pattanayak
CRISIL Limited

Using an econometric framework, we examine the nature of relation between Tobin’s Q and
family shareholding in India. While there is no obvious causality laid down by theoretical
literature, empirical evidences show a wide range of findings. In the present work, by
controlling for a host of factors, we document a non-linear relation between family share
holding and firm value. In the literature, the issue of endogeneity problem is highlighted in the
context of ownership-performance relation. We address this concern via the instrumental
variable regression method. Even though the curvilinear aspect of the relation between firm
value and insider share remain intact in all of the specifications, our model statistics do not
trace any endogeneity problem in the data.
Introduction
Ownership is a critical factor that influences firm performance. However, the
influence is moderated by a host of factors like ownership type and ownership concentration.
Consider an extreme case where shareholding is fragmented and individual investors own
1/ AT'* of the company. Contrast this with a sole proprietorship firm owned by Mr. Alex.
While Mr. Alex bears the costs and enjoys the benefits accrued in the course of firm’s
operation, in the former type of firm the outcome whether good or bad is shared by many in
proportion to their share-holding amount. The monitoring activities in a largely held firm
therefore bears ‘public-goods’ characteristics. Unless altruism is the overruling law of the
society, the ‘Homo economicus’ would maximize individual welfare function at the cost of
some activity that would fetch larger societal welfare.
±
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In case of a corporation, the cost and benefit of an individual investor is linked to
his/her proportional share ownership. Unless it is substantial, every investor would take the
‘free-rider’ route. Moreover, if the investor enjoys disproportionate power vis-a-vis his/her
shareholding amount, then siphoning of resources to other entities where he/she has higher
stake cannot be ruled out. Emerging economies are marred by umpteen market failures and
regulatory inefficiencies. In such cases, concentrated ownership may prove to be beneficial
for investors and society at large (La porta et al., 1999). In this study, we explore the vaUdity
of the statement where concentrated family shareholding is the dominant form of firm
governance.
Notwithstanding the significance of this issue, there are limited evidences of the
relation between ownership and performance in India. Sarkar and Sarkar (1999) find a Ushaped relation between director’s shareholding and firm value. In a follow-up study (2000)
they largely document a positive relation between higher director shareholding and firm
value. Khanna and Palepu (1999) do not find any significant impact of Director’s (i.e.,
Managers) shareholding on firm value. Kali and Sarkar (2005) find that interlocking
directorate, debt commitment and concentrated promoter share are the most important factors
for the superior performance of group firms. Selarka (2005) finds a U-shaped relationship
between insider/promoter’s shareholding and market to book value ratio. Most of these
studies have ignored the temporal dynamics of the relation and based on small sample size.
Moreover, since many of them have focused on large firms, the heterogeneous characteristic
of sample size is lost which is very vital for governance studies.
In this study, we develop a large panel data set using 1833 firms for years 2001-2004.
Besides overcoming issues related to sample size and type, we have controlled for any
temporal or cross-sectional shocks. Tobin’s Q and other market based measures are used as
performance parameter. The shareholding of ‘founding family’ or ‘promoter’ is the key
explanatory variable as we propose to examine the nature of relation between family
shareholding and firm-value. Indian family shareholding is disguised in the name of
promoters in the company reports. ‘Promoter’ is one of the ill defined terms in the Indian
company law. Sections like 62, 69 and 478 of The Companies Act, 1956 use the word
promoter just to impose liability without much elaboration of the term. However, Securities
and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in its 1995 Malegam Committee Report and in the
Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers regulations, 1997 has provided a working
definition of promoter. Broadly, “Promoter” is perceived as a person who brings about the
incorporation and organization of a corporation and retains the overall control power of the
company. The immediate relative of the promoter, among others, form the promoter group.
In this paper, promoter’s share is taken as the share of insiders or the combined share
of family. For example in case of Reliance Limited - which is the largest firm in terms of
market capitalization in India, share of promoters would mean share of Ambani families - a
reasonable approximation of family holding in Indian context. The estimated relation shows
that family shareholding has significant impact on firm value. However, the relation is not
linear in nature which means there is no direct proportional relation between family
shareholding and firm value. Firm value first increases, then decreases and subsequently
increases with further rise in family shareholding. Further we have tried to estimate the exact
break point of this relationship. While the break points are changed with every alternate
specification in case of polynomial equation, the grid search approach in a spline estimation
technique have fetched some unique break points. We find family holding and Tobin’s Q to
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be positively related when shareholding amount is less than 20 percent. Between 20 to 49
percent the relation is found to be negative and it turns to be positive beyond 49 percent.
We first describe (Section-I) the econometric issues involved in the estimation of the
relationship between firm value and family/insider shareholding. Section II then delineates the
theoretical argument involving insider shareholding and firm value. Data and empirical
specifications are described in section III. Regression results are discussed in sections IV and
V. Section VI concludes the paper.
I.

Some Econometric Issues
It is the most intricate task to develop a model that would satisfy each statistical
criterion while providing accurate theoretical predictions. Often the choice to employ a model
depends on the availability of timely information in the real world which is scarce. Precisely
that is one of the key reasons why econometrician sometimes violates the prescriptions of
econometric theory. However, the best one can do is to avoid large specification errors. In
ownership and performance studies, there are several econometric problems like a)
endogeneity/reverse causality b) missing variables c) sample selection bias d) variable
measurement errors. In addition, the functional form debate i.e., shape of the relationship of
ownership-performance, is not yet been resolved.
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny’s (henceforth MSV, 1988) work is the first of its kind in
which they use a piecewise linear estimation technique to make evident the incentive and
entrenchment effect in a managerial ownership-performance study. Their model can be
generalized as:
Y ^ = a ^ ^ - P J ^ x ^ ^ + 0 ^ z ^ ^ + . . . + 6pZ.p+e^, where z,. is an ownership variable and

in z.j to z.p, 1 to

shows the number of knots or spline nodes. The spline variables

are constructed in the following manner:
st
1

spline

= z^., if z^. <
= P [, otherw ise

2

^^ spline z^y = 0 , if z/< P y_ l
= Z i ~ P j - \ , if Pj - \ < Zi < Pj , ' ] =2 , . . . . ^- \

= Pj-Pj-X,ifPj<Zi
spline z/p = 0 , if z /< P p _ l
= z^. - Pp-\-> otherw ise

The piecewise linear relation is assumed to have P ^break points. Here, the number
of breakpoints has to be pre-determined. To decide the breakpoints often people have relied
on the institutional structure of respective countries. The advantage of the above method is
that regression line is continuous at the different spline node that is unlikely in case of slope
dummy methods. The slope dummy method does not require the various segments to meet at
the joint points.
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As pointed out earlier there are numerous studies which have used quadratic or
polynomial regression model to study the ownership-performance. The Polynomial regression
model can be specified as:

Y.=ai +

+ ... +

+

O^z. +

+ £*.

One of the advantages of such specification is that the turning points are determined
empirically thus limiting the arbitrariness. However, there are certain disadvantages like - the
turning points are sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of other control variables, turning points
may be inconsequential in nature thereby not helping in policy studies/formulation. It may not
fit the data well if the nonlinear relationship is not smooth. Finally, it restricts any kind of
comparison with previous studies by providing new break points with each set of control
variables.
Cho (1998), Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) Demsetz and Villalonga (2001)
and many others have used simultaneous equation model to study the ownership-performance
relation. Whenever the relationship is two-way apphcation of OLS will give biased estimator.
A simple simultaneous equation model could be written as:

Y.^= dfj
Yi2 = Ofj + ^2yn

Pik^ik

Y
If one estimates the first equation ignoring the fact that
ig endogenous, then the
estimator will be biased and inconsistent i.e., they do not approach the true values of the
parameter as sample size increases. Reverse causality or endogeneity is an important concern
in corporate governance studies as several studies documented that performance and
ownership are endogenous variables. Despite a strong theoretical linkage between
concentrated ownership and firm performance, there is a potential causality that runs fi*om
performance to ownership for better performing firms. If this argument holds then OLS
regression would suffer from simultaneous-equation bias. Similarly, if there are some
unobserved factors, which influence ownership and performance that are left out then the
estimated coefficient of managerial ownership will only reflect a spurious correlation, not a
causal relationship (Himmelberg et al, 1999). Formally, the argument may be stated in the
following way:
z

= j3x + € .

x = y z + T]

where ^ (£ -)

= ^ ( 77) =

0 and C o v (f,7 7 )

= cr^

Where ^ denotes firm performance and ^ ownership concentration. If we estimate
p ^ p + c o v {x ,e )/

the first equation by OLS, we obtain

/ ^^^(-^)

When we simplify c o v { x , s )
replacing the value of-*, it turns out to be cov{x,e) = cov{yz+r],£) = co^{'y{Px+e)+T1,e] = ycTl+ P ycov{x,£)+ a^

The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance & Business Ventures, Vol. 12^ fxx. d

cov{x,e)-P ycov(x,e) = ycy] + a ^ ,c o v { x ,E \\-P y ) =

109

and

.2

cov{x,e) =

or cr^ TtO, the estimated coefficients p will be biased and inconsistent. The
first is true in case of structural reverse causality, the second if common unobserved factors
are present. Cho (1998) has tried to address the former type of problem whereas Himmelberg
et al.(1999) have addressed the later type of problem. The case for using fixed effect approach
lies with the later type of problem. However, fixed effect approach is severely criticized as it
does not explain variation between firms. Moreover, there may be unobserved factors which
vary over time as a result fixed effect estimators will be biased and inconsistent. In many
cases, variation between firms is important to know as it will show which firm specific
arrangements improve performance.
The missing variable phenomenon is also important in corporate governance studies as
each study is directed to achieve certain limited objectives. There are several governance
mechanisms like ownership structure, capital structure, board Structure, management
compensation, product market competition and market for corporate control. It is difficult to
incorporate all aspects of governance in a single equation; paucity of adequate information
further makes it a formidable task. Therefore, empirical studies are prone to have biased
coefficient estimation. Apart from that the other defect arises on account of sample selection.
Often researchers consider large and listed firms for corporate governance studies. However,
these firms are not randomly selected rather selection is influenced by few endogenous
variables such as firm performance indicators. Very often large and better performing firms
prefer to go public. As long as the sample is censored on the basis of left-hand dependent
variable, the estimated coefficient will be biased. This is a major problem suffered by most of
the studies.
II.

Ownership-Performance: What the theory says
Theoretical prediction on ownership and performance relation is not uniquely
identified. The causality flows in both the direction i.e., from ownership to performance and
vice-versa. However, none of the theoretical reasonings are insignificant in nature. We
elaborate a few of them in the following paragraphs.
The convergence of interest or incentive alignment argument states that firm
performance is an increasing function of insider share ownership (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). The separation of ownership and control creates an agency conflict. The agency cost
will be limited if the owner-manager holds substantial amount of share in the firm. The
logical concomitant of this h)^)othesis is that there is a ‘steady positive relationship’ between
management or insider ownership and corporate value. With increased stake, managers or
insiders pay a larger share of the cost of deviation from value maximization and are therefore
less likely to squander corporate wealth. Hence, agency costs and management ownership
would be negatively related.
The reward argument predicts a positive relationship between insider ownership and
firm performance. This suggests that firms reward their managers with equity ownership for
their strong past performance (Kole, 1996). This statement has implication for causality and
timings of ownership and performance variables. For example, now the relationship is of
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nsLtrnQ: O w nership, = f (P e r fo r m a n c e , whereas the incentive alignment argument predicts
that Performance, = /{Ownership,).
Cho (1998) has stated that ‘other things being equal, managers may prefer equity
compensation when they expect their firm to perform well and consequently the value of the
firm to increase. As a result, higher levels of insider ownership are expected at firms with
high corporate values’. Cho’s prediction is fundamentally different from Kole’s argument so
far as timing is concerned because Kole emphasizes the relationship between past
performance and present ownership whereas Cho predicts the relationship between expected
performance and current ownership. Therefore, we can express the relationship as
Ownership, = f (Performance!^^) whQYQ Performance!^^ \s corporate performance at time t+1

as expected at time t. On the other hand, Kole’s argument implies
ihdiXOwnership, = f (Performance,^^).
The second line of argument predicts a negative relationship between insider
shareholding and firm value. When insiders equity stake in the firm is not substantial and
shareholders are too dispersed to take action against non-value maximization behavior,
insiders may deploy corporate assets to obtain personal benefits, such as shirking and
perquisite consumption. Also as Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983) point out,
insiders holding a substantial portion of a firm’s equity may have enough voting power to
ensure that their position inside the company is protected. As a result, they may become to a
great extent insulated from external disciplining forces such as the takeover threat or the
managerial labor market. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (MSV, 1988) have named this as
entrenchment effect. However the question arises if the insider is the majority owner, then as
per incentive ahgnment thesis he/she should endeavor to maximize profit. But, isn’t it too
much generalization of managerial/insider behavior? The manager may become increasingly
less motivated by money as his wealth increases. Things such as ‘power’, ‘prestige’, ‘empire
building’ may be equally or possibly more important for an extremely wealthy person.
There is another strand of argument which holds the relation to be cyclical or
undulating. Stulz (1988) has developed a formal model where he has presented an inverted Ushaped relation between management ownership (through voting rights) and firm
performance. It is stated that value of the firm is positively related to voting rights when
voting rights is small and vice-versa. Firm performance tends to rise at each increment in
managerial share at the beginning. However, it falls and reaches its minimum when the
manager/insider holds more than fifty percent share in a firm. To note Stulz’s analysis
revolves around the takeover premium argument. The basic argument is that insiders with
higher levels of ownership are positioned to oppose takeover threat from the market.
Therefore the acquirer has to pay higher takeover premiums to increase the likelihood of the
success of the takeovers. But, with higher levels of managerial ownership the possibility of
successful takeover diminishes and therefore firm performance starts to decline after a
sufficiently high level of ownership. Firm performance reaches its minimum when insider
shareholding is around fifty percent in the firm because with majority ownership the chances
of successful takeover become dim.
In a sharp contrast to all of the above reasoning, Demsetz has argued ownership
structure is an endogenous outcome of several competitive processes thereby denies any
linkage between managerial ownership and firm performance. Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and
Lehn (1985), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Kole and Lehn (1997) have argued for such
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kind of relationship. Their basic argument is that ownership structure with insufficient
performance will fail to survive in the long run. Demsetz (1983) has put a strong criticism
against Berle and Means (1932) thesis that an inverse correlation exist between diffuseness of
shareholdings and firm performance. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argued that the
ownership structure of a firm is an endogenous outcome of decisions that reflect the influence
of shareholders and of stock market trading. The ownership structure that emerges, whether
concentrated or diffused, is influenced by profit maximizing interest of the shareholders, so
that there is no systematic relationship between variation in ownership and performance.
While there is no convergence in theoretical argument, the empirical evidences
support each strand of argument. One of the important dimensions which seem to receive
scanty attention is the institutional structure of the country. The country’s suprastructure
defines the broad governance mode of every micro unit of the country. Ownership as an
important incentive mechanism operates within the boundary set by the law and regulations of
the country. While incentive is the driver for any economic activity, its strength is critically
linked to broad provisioning and enforcement of law. Therefore, while viewing any countryspecific findings, one should juxtapose it with the economic and legal development in the
respective countries.
III.

Data and Empirical Specifications
The initial sample consists of 1,833 listed firms obtained from Prowess database
maintained by Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). Most of the firms are listed in
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and National Stock Exchange (NSE) - the two largest stock
exchange of India. For each firm we have four years of observation i.e., 2000-01 to 2003-04.
Out of a large panel we have eliminated firms for which a) sales b) shareholding pattern and
c) selected stock indicators like share price and market capitalization are missing. The sample
is a mix of large and small firms. Previous well-known studies like MSV (1988), Agrawal and
Knoeber (1996) and Cho (1998), have collected sample from Fortune 500 list. One criticism
against all these studies is that since the relation between a governance mechanism and
performance may depend upon firm size, a perfect sample should be heterogeneous in terms
of size. We have taken care of this problem by including both large and small firms in the
sample.
The dependent variable in the regression model is Tobin’s Q which is defined as the
ratio of the market value of a firm plus the market value of its debt—to the replacement value
of the net fixed assets of the firm. Since market value exhibit the discounted present value of
its expected future income stream, it is undoubtedly a forward measure of firm performance.
Q ratio taking into account the future prospects of the firm provides a measure of
management’s ability to generate certain income stream from an asset base (Short and
Keasey, 1999). The higher is the Tobin's Q, the more is the market value of the firm.
We have used two methods - a) a cubic (polynomial) equation method b) Spline
method. The primary specification is:
Tobin's Q.^ = a + p(ownership ) + yX.^ +6^->rS^ +

The ownership.^ variable measures the fraction of the equity of firm i, lying between
zero and one, which is owned by insiders in period t. The control variables X.^ are firm
specific factors. In the model, industry specific fixed effects are S., time effects 6^ and a
random unobserved component

. To introduce non-linearity in the model, we have used the
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polynomial function of insider ownership such as (ownershipf.^,{ownershipy.f . Each
explanatory variable is described 'm.Appendix 1.
As mentioned earlier such formulation has certain disadvantages because of which we
have introduced a piecewise linear regression model. It is called piecewise linear as it is pre
supposed that ownership has one linear effect on Q-ratio within a certain range of its values,
but a different linear effect, at a different range. This model allows for changes in slope, with
the restriction that the line being estimated is continuous - that is it consists of two or more
straight line segments. In a cubic or quadratic model, the slope changes continuously with
variable but in piecewise linear specification, the slope is same or constant in a particular
segment. The model with spHne specification which is adopted here is as follows:
Tobin's Q ,= a + m N S . S P \ \ + p,{lN S.SP2)+P,{IN S.SP,) + r X ,+ d ,+ 5 ,+ e ,,
INS.SP represents a spline node. We have generated three spline variables of insider
ownership containing two knots at 0.20 and 0.49. More formally, let

^

variables to be created
i-lv jH -l
corresponding knots, and INS (insider share) be
the original variable. Then,
Z/VS'i =rmn(INS,k^) and/TVS'. =max{min(/A^*S',A:.),^^_i}-A:._i where i=2,...,n
The
marginal
spline
specification
is
defined
as
/JVS. =/JVSand/ArS,=max(0,/Ar5-^,_.) where
spe^.ifi,ation is preferred
as the generated variables when used in estimation, its coefficient represent the change in the
slope from the preceding interval. For example, INS.SP2 in the marginal specification shows
the change in slope fi*om after insider ownership 0.20 to before insider ownership 0.49.
Therefore, it tests for the differences in slopes. In non-marginal spline specification, INS.SP2
would have measured the slopes for the interval i.e., 0.20 to 0.49. Another advantage of
marginal spline specification is that it makes possible to test whether the change in slope is
significant, i.e., if the effect of INS.SP2 is not significant then the effect of insider ownership
does not change after the break point. Hence in the final specification we include three
marginal spline variables.
The knots at [0-20], [0.20-0.49] and above are finalized after extensive search at
different threshold level. Also, the decisions are influenced by the break-points which are
obtained from the polynomial estimation. Morck et al. (1988) have categorically stated that
the knots are arbitrary in nature. Given the criticism, we have tried to link the knots to Indian
property right’s regime which is discussed later in the paper.
IV.

Empirical Findings
Table I to IV report the estimate of the determinants of firm value as proxied by
Tobin’s Q. The different models are designed to address many econometric issues such as
specification bias, omitted variable bias, spatio-temporal effects, outlier problem, robustness
of the result and endogeneity problem. Model 1 reports results from a baseline specification
using pooled data for all firm-years. Model 2 to 4 is the augmented pooled data estimates
while in Model 5 & 6 we have taken 4-year average of each variable. In the parenthesis,
below each coefficient, we report the heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.
The basehne specification confirms the curvilinear hypothesis that the relationship
between performance of firms and insider ownership is cubic in form. The coefficient of the

The Journal o f Entrepreneurial Finance & Business Ventures. Vol. 12. hs. d

113

variables INS and INS3 are positive while the quadratic term is negative. This result provides
evidence for the general functional form of the relation between Tobin’s Q and insider
ownership - that management move from alignment, to entrenchment, to alignment as their
ownership stake in the firm increases. Below each model, we provide p-value of F-statistics
for the joint hypothesis that all the three of the insider ownership coefficients are jointly zero
(i.e., joint exclusion test). For model-1, the P-value is 0.00 that rules out the null hypothesis.
In figure 1, we plot the predicted Tobin’s Q and Insider share. The graph shows that,
corporate value increases with insider ownership but begins to decline at higher levels of
ownership. Finally, corporate value increases at a very high level of insider ownership. This
finding is in conformity with convergence of interest and entrenchment effects at increasing
levels of insider ownership. Higher amount of family stake in the firm persuades the members
to do better monitoring activities that results in higher market value. When we have calculated
the tuming points for this baseline specification, the turning points are found at 0.29 (maxima)
and 0.56 (minima) point of insider ownership.
This finding suggests that insiders in India entrench themselves at a very high level of
ownership. In general we see in advanced countries, managers entrench at very low levels of
share ownership (MSV, 1988). This difference in findings could be attributed to institutional
differences between emerging economies and advanced countries. Several studies
documented that Ovmership in US is less concentrated (Denis and McConnell, 2003; Roe,
2005; La Porta et al., 1999). Highly diffused ownership structure enables the manager or
insider to entrench at low level of share-holding as non-insider shareholdings are diffused
(MSV, 1988). Second, as MSV (1988), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Cho (1998), have
collected sample from Fortune 500 list i.e., large firms, it is not surprising to see managers to
entrench at low level of ownership because major block holdings will be absence in such
firms. However in India ownership is highly concentrated. The concomitant governance
structure allows insiders to entrench only at a higher level of ownership.
Model-2 is augmented by introducing many control variables and it is also controlled
for temporal shocks. The sign and significance of ownership variables remain unaltered.
Further the result shows a convex non-linear impact of firm size (i.e., sales) on firm value.
Firm value (Q-ratio) first decreases and then increases in log of sales (Isales) which is
consistent with the curvilinear findings of Himmelberg et al.(1999). Whether economies of
scale or organizational efficiency (X-efficiency) is the reason for positive association of value
and size for large firms require a more scientific investigation. In our earlier study (Pant and
Pattanayak, 2005), we find the absence of scale economies in Indian industry. Therefore,
intemal capital market advantages and organizational efficiency of large firms could be the
reason for higher Q-ratio.
Leverage or debt intensity is positive, as the point estimate is 0.63 with high statistical
significance. To test for non-linearity, the model-2 includes a squared leverage term which is
found to be positive and statistically significant. A high commitment of fixed debt payment
helps in alleviating the excess cash flow problems. This is also consistent with the signaling
argument (Ross, 1977) and free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986). For US firms, while MSV
(1988) and Demsetz & Villalonga (2001) show a negative influence of debt on firm value,
McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a positive impact
Next, the coefficient of R&D intensity is positive and statistically significant. R&D
expenditure is a soft spending and insiders have informational advantage vis-a-vis outsiders. It
may involve managerial private benefits. The positive estimate suggests that higher spending
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in R&D leads to higher Q-ratio. The point estimate of advertising or promotional expenditure
is 0.06, which is statistically significant at less than 1 percent level. Advertising expenditure
captures the effect of intangible assets along with R&D expense. Higher expenditure in
advertising helps firm in building reputation and acts as entry deterrence for the new entrants
in the industry.
It is observed that lesser is the capital intensity (K/S) of firms, higher is the value (Qratio). Himmelberg et al. (1999) find an inverse U-shape relationship between capital intensity
and firm value where as Habib et al. (2003) show a U-shape relation between firm efficiency
score and capital intensity. When we include in model-2, the squared term of capital intensity,
not only both the coefficient became insignificant but also we observe the turning point in the
U-shape curve at 2737.28 that is much beyond the capital intensity ratio in sample firms (the
maximum value in our sample is 1866). Hence, we submit capital intensity has a linear
negative effect on firm value in India. Theoretically, a greater investment in tangible fixed
assets is easy to monitor, thus, alleviates the fear of managerial moral hazard. Similarly, firms
with higher amount of intangible capital may be subject to greater agency problems as capital
providers cannot observe, monitor and assess spending on intangibles easily. However, firms
operating with higher proportions of intangible assets may adopt a strict governance structure
to signal investors that they want to prevent the future misuse of resources (Klapper and Love,
2002).
Stock market liquidity is a major concern in emerging economies. The scrips that are
traded frequently shall command higher price in the market. The coefficient of liquidity
confirms that companies whose stock turnover is high tend to have higher market value. The
final variable in model-2 is BSE 500, a categorical variable equal to 1 if the firm is Bombay
Stock Exchange 500 (BSE-500) firms. It is akin to Fortune-500 firms globally. In the sample,
there are 353 BSE-500 firms (70.6 percent of BSE-500). In addition, once a firms name
appears in BSE-500, investors’ confidence level on that firm increases that translates into
higher stock price. Whenever such kinds of firms come with additional issues, it generally
gets oversubscribed. BSE-500 firms are much larger in comparison to non-BSE 500 firms.
Thus, to test the quality and size effects we include BSE-500 categorical variable in the
model. As expected, the dummy variable is turned out to be positive and highly significant.
On an average, the market value of BSE-500 firms is 41 percent more in comparison to nonBSE 500 firms.
In Model-3, we include another categorical variable i.e.. Foreign presence
(FORPRES). If the promoter shareholding includes share by foreign promoter/collaborator. It
is coded as one, otherwise zero. Foreign promoter/collaborator viewed as strategic partner for
domestic corporations when specifically, they share superior technological expertise. The
technological and organizational advantages of foreign firms and their ability to operate
intemationally bring reputational advantages vis-a-vis domestically owned firms. In the
sample there are 345 firms with foreign promoter/collaborator shareholding. The categorical
variable shows that firms with foreign promoter share tend to have higher market value.
To test the effect of devolution of property rights to foreign promoters/collaborators,
we have generated two categorical variable i.e., FORS: 26-51 percent and F0RS>51 percent
where the reference category is less than 26 percent of foreign promoter shareholding. Both
the dummy variables have positive sign with high statistical significance. The size of the
estimate is large when foreign promoter shareholding is more than 51 percent. This provides
evidence that foreign promoter shareholding is beneficial for other investors.
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Following Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Welch
(2003), in model 5 and 6 , four years (i.e., 2001-2004) average of each variable are taken. In
model-5, the sign of INS & INS3 is positive while the sign of INS2 is negative. The turning
points are observed at 0.29 (maxima) and 0.53 (minima). It is observed that the coefficient of
INS3 is at least twice of coefficient of INS. This suggests high powered incentives by way of
increased share ownership raises effort that influences firm value positively.
To avoid possible spurious correlation between ownership and Q-ratio through
industry effects we have used 2-digit industry dummy based on National industrial
classification (1998) which is akin to Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). We have not
reported the intercept as each industry gets its own intercept. There is an ongoing debate in
governance studies - whether to control for firm level fixed effects or at the industry level.
Using firm level fixed effects is problematic as it removes all cross-section variation that is
important in the present study. Firm specific dummy variables eliminates all between firm
variations fi-om the data. It only exploits the within group variation in the data as the mean
demeaning procedure eliminates between variation. Since the cross-sectional variation is
important in governance studies, we prefer industry dummy rather than firm level dummy
variables (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Zhou, 2001). Zhou (2001) argues that Himmelberg
et al. (1999) could not find any link between ownership incentives and firm performance as
fixed effects of firm remove all cross-section variation.
Model-7 in Table-II is the replication of model-1 of Table-1 that does not include any
control variables. As per hypothesis, the sign of INS and INS^ is positive and sign of INS^ is
negative. It confirms the previous findings that insiders move from alignment, to
entrenchment to alignment as their ownership stake increases in the firm. All the ownership
variables found to be jointly significant. Here, the turning points are found at 0.30 (maxima)
and 0.52 (minima). Model-8, 9 and 10 is the replication of model-2, 3 & 4 with industry fixed
effects. In case of Model-10, the value of maxima is observed at 0.32 of insider ownership
and minima at 0.52.
Following Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (MSV, 1988) we adopt a piecewise-linear
model to exactly identify the non-monotonicity in the relation between insider stock
ownership and firm performance. This model allows for the effect of holdings to change at
different threshold points known as spline nodes. In the present work, we choose the knots at
[0-0.20], [0.20-0.49] and above 0.49. As MSV (1988) state, such type of chosen nodes has
some arbitrary elements. However, to limit the discretion and to derive policy implications,
we have attempted to link the spline nodes with Indian property rights regime as per
Companies Act, 1956 (See, Appendix-2). First two models in Table-3 are presented for a
comparison purpose with the subsequent two models of this table. Sarkar and Sarkar (2000)
find in a cross-sectional study that firm value decreases up to 25 percent of managerial
shareholding and increases thereafter. To test that, in model-11 we have created two knots at
[0-0.25] and above. Unlike Sarkar et al., we find the coefficient of both insider variables to be
positive and insignificant.
Indian property rights regime is defined in such a way that when shareholding level is
less than 26 percent, one cannot block special resolutions. As shareholdings go beyond 26
percent, one can stop the passing of a special resolution. A special resolution requires the
support of 3/4th majority of shareholders present and entitled to voting as per section 189 of
Indian Companies Act, 1956. When the shareholding level exceeds 50 percent, one can pass
ordinary resolutions, which govern most of the activities of the firm. Thus varying degrees of
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control power is associated with each level of ownership stake, thus one can expect its effect
to be exhibited in firm performance. Accordingly we have generated three spline nodes at [00.26], [0.26-0.51] and above in model-12. As one can see in the model, the sign of each
ownership variable is as per expectation i.e., INS.SPl and INS.SP3 is positive and INS.SP2 is
negative. However, none of the ownership variables is significant at the conventional level of
significance. Only INS.SF3 shows to be significant at 10 percent level.
In model-13 & 14, the spline nodes are fixed at [0-0.20], [0.20-0.49] and above. We
have selected the cutoff point after extensive search at several points, including the turning
points that are emerged in the cubic estimation. In the cubic model, we find the values of
maxima to vary fi*om 0.28 to 0.32 and the values of minima to vary from 0.45 to 0.54. But, the
spline specification best fits in the aforementioned range. To state here 0.49 is only 0.02 point
less than 0.51 where one gets simple majority. Therefore, once insider has 49 percent or more
shareholding in the firm, it is enough for them to collude with some small stakeholders to
block special resolutions as and when the situation demands.
The baseline specification model-13 does not include any control variables and like
earlier tables we report the heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics below each estimated
coefficients. As per hypothesis of the study, we find the firm value to increase when insider
stake is less than 20 percent and beyond 49 percent but it declines in the range of 20 to 49
percent. In model-14, all of the explanatory variables are included. The sign and significance
of each ownership coefficient is consistent with the previous findings. For each 1 percent
increase in ownership between 0 and 20 percent, firm value increases by an average 0.005 and
for each 1 percent increase in ownership from 20 percent to 49 percent, firm value declines by
0.007 points. As we have taken marginal spline specification, the coefficient shows the
change in the slope from the preceding intervals. Instead of change in slope, if one wants to
get the actual slope of INS.SP2, one has to add coefficient of INS.SPl and INS.SP2.
Similarly, to get the slope of INS.SP3, one has to add the coefficient of INS.SPl, INS.SP2
and INS.SP3. After getting the actual slope, we divide it by 100 to give percentage
explanation since each ownership variable is in decimal.
V.

Endogeneity Problem
There are two kinds of endogeneity problem discussed in the governance literature.
First, the problem of reverse causality i.e., ownership and performance influences each other
(Cho, 1998). Second, the issue of unobserved heterogeneity i.e., ownership may be
endogenous because of individual heterogeneity affecting both firm value and its ownership
structure (Himmelberg et al., 1999). Cho (1998) argues that managers would like to be
compensated through equity when they expect the performance of firms to increase. In other
words, performance of firm influences the ownership stake of managers. In addition, incentive
alignment argument predicts the performance of firms to increase with increment in
managerial holdings. In the presence of this mutual interdependence, OLS will give biased
and inconsistent coefficients. Similarly, if there are certain unobserved factors which
influences both ownership and performance, and omitted from value equation, the resulting
estimates will be biased. This will happen as the ownership variables in the value equation
will be correlated with the error term of the model i.e.,
^ 0 .
In India, as per employee stock option plans (ESOP, section 17 of the Income Tax
Act, 1961; SEBI Regulations, Indian Companies Act, 1956 sec.79 A), an employee is given
the option to acquire shares of the company at a pre-defined discount price after a certain
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period. It is open to all permanent employees and to the directors of the company. However
an employee who is a promoter or belongs to the promoter group shall not be eligible to
participate in the scheme. Also, a director who either by himself or through his relative or
through any body corporate, directly or indirectly holds more than 10 percent of the
outstanding equity shares of the company shall not be eligible to participate in the scheme. In
addition, under employee stock purchase plan (ESPP) company offers shares to employees as
part of a public issue or otherwise. In this plan, large shareholders and promoters are not
allowed to take part. In this study, we have taken promoters’ shareholding as insider or family
holding. Therefore, deflnitionally they cannot participate in any of such schemes. This
partially rules out the first concern of endogeneity that is interdependence of performance and
stock reward. Other than that, Stiglitz (1994) has given a political-economy argument of
exogenous relationship of ownership-performance in an emerging economy. He articulated
the exogenous relationship on the basis of illiquid capital market in less developed economies.
Since in emerging economy the capital market is less than perfectly liquid, it is difficult for
investors to trade and change ownership structure in response to changing condition.
The next problem is the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. To solve this problem,
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) use lagged ownership variables as instruments for managerial
ownership. Himmelberg et al.(1999) use Isales, Isales^ and sigma as the instruments.
However, Himmelberg et al.’s (1999) FV-variables are subject to criticism as they use these
same variables as the predictors of Q-ratio in their previous models.
In Table-IV, we present the IV-model estimates of Tobin’s Q on insider ownership
and other control variables. In Model-15, we take lagged ownership variables as instrumental
variables (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Gugler and Weigand, 2003; Muller and Spitz,
2002). Like previous models, the coefficient of INS and INS^ is positive and INS^ is negative.
Each ownership variable is statistically significant at conventional level of significance. In the
last row of the table, we present two tests of endogeneity of regressors. The null hypothesis of
the test is that an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator of the same equation would yield
consistent estimates; that is any endogeneity among the regressors would not have deleterious
effects on OLS estimates (Baum, Schaffer & Stillman, 2003). As the P-value suggests, one
could not reject the null hypothesis here. Thus, it rejects the assumption of endogeneity of
regressors that is insider ownership variables are not endogenous variables. The equation is
exactly identified because there are three endogenous variables and three instrumental
variables.
In Model 16, we introduce two more instrumental variables i.e., p (market risk) and
its S.Ep (firm risk). The p coefficient is obtained through a regression of weekly returns of
firm on weekly return of sensex (BSE sensitive index) for each year. The standard error
obtained from the regression is used to estimate firm risk (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001;
Welch, 2003).
is a commonly used measure to assess the volatility of returns relative to a
benchmark index. A stock with a P higher than one has higher risk than the average company
in the market; while a P below one is associated with lower risk. As managers are risk
averse, a negative relation is expected between firm risk and insider ownership (Himmelberg
et al., 1999). On the other hand, greater is the instability in the firm’s environment, higher is
the opportunity for managerial discretion. Therefore, Demsetz et al., (2001) predicts a positive
relationship between risk and ownership.
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In model-16, all the ownership variables possess the expected sign and significance.
Though it holds the basic hypothesis of convergence of interest and entrenchment, the model
is rejected on the basis of Wu-Hausaman F test given in the last row. The P-value shows that
one can not reject the null at conventional level of significance which imply the regressors are
not endogenous. Model-17 & 18 is estimated by error component two stage least square
model introduced by Baltagi (1995, ch-7). As random effects estimator is a weighted average
of the between and within estimator, likewise error component two stage least square
estimator (ec2 sls) is a weighted average of two stage least square estimation of a between
estimator and two stage least square estimation of a within estimator. Each insider ownership
variable in model-17 & 18 is statistically significant and bears the expected sign. Model-17
uses the lagged ownership variables as instruments while model-18 includes two more
instrumental variables i.e., P andS.^'^.
VI.

Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to examine the influence of insider shareholding on firm
value. It is well known that in a typical Indian firm average stake of insiders is more than fifty
percent. That clearly negates the separation of cash flow rights and control rights and the
ensuing agency problem. However, that poses a new problem which is prevalent in Asian
economies known as ‘large investor activism’. This paper is an attempt to disentangle the
performance and entrenchment effect of dominant shareholder in Indian firms.
Our examination supports the non-linear relation between insider shareholding and
firm value. The interest alignment effect works at very low and extreme high level of insider
shareholding, while entrenchment effect is operative in medium range of insider shareholding.
We argue that when family shareholding is not substantial, they are unable to entrench
themselves. However, when their stake increases and in the range of 20 to 49 percent, the
force of market mechanism becomes weak and allow the insiders to exercise their
discretionary power. Their incentive to consume at office or divert resources to the entity
where they have exclusive ownership increases. But, what happens when insiders become the
major shareholder in the firm? We find that as and when insiders’ stake exceeds 49 percent,
there is a realignment of interest with the firm. On account of majority stake in the firm, they
stand to bear the maximum loss for each dollar forgone. As per the monitoring hypothesis,
with greater ownership, insiders keep an eye on other constituents of the firm and the firm
gets rid of the free rider problem associated with dispersed ownership. Therefore, our
conjecture is that unlike other Asian countries, concentrated ownership in Indian firms has not
posed a systemic major challenge so far.
This study also confirms another hypothesis that is presence of foreign promoter in a
firm and their amount of shareholding has a positive impact on firm value. This may be due to
reputational effect of foreign promoter’s shareholding in a firm. Investors may perceive
foreign promoters shareholding as an indicator of firms’ quality. Unlike previous studies, this
study finds that foreign promoter shareholding has a positive impact on firm value at each
threshold limit of shareholding. But, the effect becomes more pronounced when foreign
promoter shareholding exceeds 51 per cent in the firm. These findings provide support to the
ongoing reform program in India and calls for a complete removal of sect oral foreign direct
investment cap.
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Table I
Determinants of Firm Value: Pooled Estimates
VARIABLE

INS

mssQ
INSCU

MOD-1
1.1574
(3.60)*
-3.0371
(-3.81)-^
2.3769
(4.03)=^

LN(S)
LN(S)2
Y/S
LEV

-

LEVSQ
R&D/K
ADV/K

-

I/K
K/S
LN(AGE)
LIQUIDITY
FORPRES
FORS;26-51%
FORS:>51%
BSE 500
R-square
F Stat: Prob > F
Prob>F:(insider)#
Year dummy:
Obs.

0.0046
0.00
0.00
NO
7329

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TOBIN'S Q
AVERAGE OF 2001-2004
POOLED DATA
MOD-5
MOD-6
MOD-4
MOD-3
MOD-2
1.0206
1.2309
0.9326
0.7227
0.7751
(1.74)**
(1.87)**
(3.07)*
(2.36)*
(2.53)“^
-2.5602
-3.2338
-2.4861
-1.9466
-1.9550
(-1.80)**
(-2.06)*
(-3.30)*
(-2.55)*
(-2.56)*
2.5926
2.0218
1.9950
1.6932
1.7023
(1.92)*
(2.28)*
(3.55)*
(2.98)*
(2.99)*
-0.0842
-0.0631
-0.0635
-0.0604
(-3.26)*
(-5.04)*
(-5.03)*
(-4.81)*
0.0101
0.0073
0.0074
0.0071
(2.41)*
(3.60)*
(3.59)*
(3.42)*
0.0018
0.0007
0.0005
0.0005
(1.63)**
(2.05)*
(1.70)**
(1.55)§
0.8536
0.6828
0.6402
0.6270
(10.57)*
(12.22)*
(11.22)*
(10.77)*
0.0801
0.0863
0.0913
0.0988
(2.27)*
(2.67)*
(2.73)*
(2.84)*
5.6383
4.5621
4.5609
4.6277
(3.07)*
(5.15)*
(5.08)*
(5.15)*
0.0702
0.0566
0.0618
0.0623
(1.65)*
(2.34)*
(2.33)*
(2.30)*
0.0365
0.0443
0.0417
0.0381
(0.63)
(1.88)**
(1.84)**
(1.76)**
-0.0008
-0.0004
-0.0004
-0.0003
(-1.14)
(-2.38)*
(-2.38)*
(-1.99)*
0.0023
-0.0348
-0.0290
-0.0275
(0.10)
(-2.21)*
(-2.66)*
(-2.10)*
17.2697
16.3626
15.5405
15.9149
(3.87)*
(3.97)*
(2.19)*
(3.79)*
0.1403
(6.64)*
0.2748
0.2013
(3.93)=^
(5.30)=^
0.4287
0..4084
(7.15)=^
(3.89)-^
0.3306
0.4130
0.3666
0.3903
(5.86)**
(13.24)*
(12.32)’*
0.2109
0.2170
0.2297
0.3291
0.0518
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
Yes
Yes
Ind. Dummy
Yes
Ind. Dummy
7305
1826
7305
7305
1830

Notes:
Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are in Parentheses. Standard Errors are calculated using
White's heteroskedasticity consistent variance-covariance matrix.
* indicates significance at 5 percent level, ** indicates significance at 10 percent level, § indicates
significance a t 15 percent level.
^ fo r models P-value of Joint exclusion test o f insider ovjnership is given; for which the null hypothesis is
all the insider-ovi/nership variables are jointly Zero.
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Table II
Determinants of Firm Value: Fixed Effects Regression Estimates
VARIABLE
MOD-7
INS

1.0216

INSSQ

-2.6574
(-3.35)*
2.1500
(3.70)’^

(3 .1 ir

INSCU
LN(S)
LN(S)2
Y/S
LEV
LEVSQ
R&D/K
ADV/K
I/K
K/S
LN(AGE)
LIQUIDITY
FORPRES

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TOBIN'S Q
Industry Fixed Effects
MOD-8
MOD-9
0.7533
0.7049
(2.42)’^
(2.26)*
-1.7712
-1.7868
(-2.34)’^
(-2.36)*
1.5422
1.5536
(2.77)’^
(2.79)*
-0.0679
-0.0694
(-5.23)’^
(-5.35)*
0.0086
0.0087
(4.05)*
(4.13)*
0.0005
0.0005
(1.62)**
(1.69)**
0.7117
0.7206
(12.57)*
(12.94)*
0.0817
0.0754
(2.56)*
(2.45)*
4.1301
4.1119
(4.63)*
(4.60)*
0.0608
0.0601
(2.30)*
(2.33)*
0.0213
0.0250
(1.23)
(1.38)
-0.0004
-0.0004
(-2.52)*
(-2.78)*
0.0037
0.0026
(0.27)
(0.19)
11.3492
11.8262
(2 .66)*
(2.77)*
0.1397
(6.41)*

FORS:26-51%

0.3991

0.3780

0.1943
(5.09)*
0..4170
(7.26)*
0.3550

0.2288
0.00
0.00
Yes
7305

0.2344
0.00
0.00
Yes
7305

0.2470
0.00
0.00
Yes
7305

FORS>51%
BSE 500
Adj. R-square
F Stat: Prob > F
Prob>F:(insider)#
Year dummy:
Obs.

0.0336
0.00
0.00
No
7329

MOD-10
0.9452
(3.05)*
-2.3905
(-3.19)*
1.8943
(3.44)*
-0.0683
(-5.32)*
0.0086
(4.13)*
0.0007
(2.07)*
0.7668
(14.06)*
0.0694
(2.33)*
4.1453
(4.68)*
0.0545
(2.32)*
0.0266
(1.43)§
-0.0005
(-2.77)*
-0.0006
(-0.04)
12.1547
(2.85)*

Notes:
Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are in Parentheses. Standard Errors are calculated using
White's heteroskedasticity consistent variance-covariance matrix.
* indicates significance a t 5 percent level, ** indicates significance at 10 percent level, § indicates
significance a t 15 percent level.
# fo r models P-value o f Joint exclusion test o f insider ownership is given; for which the null hypothesis is
all the insider-ownership variables are jointly Zero.
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Table III
Determinants of Firm Value: Fixed Effects Regression with Spline Variables
VARIABLE

IN S-SPl
INS.SP2

0.0606
(0.34)
0.1185
(0.59)

INS.SP3
LN(S)
LN(S)2
Y/S
LEV
LEVSQ
R&D/K
ADV/K
I/K
K/S
LN(AGE)
LIQUIDITY
FORPRES
FORS:26-51%
FORS>5l7o
BSE 500
Adj. R-square
F Stat: Prob > F
Prob>F:(insider)#
Year dummy:
Obs.

-0.0715
(-5.56)*
0.0088
(4.23)*
0.0007
(2 . 12)*
0.7821
(14.49)*
0.0663
(2.25)*
4.1363
(4.68)*
0.0552
(2.35)*
0.0262
(1.41)*
-0.0005
(-2.82)*
0.0015
(0 .11)
12.3628
(2.91)*
0.1954
(5.09)*
0.4129
(7.21)*
0.3553
(11.25)”
0.2453
0.00
0.00
Yes
7305

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TOBIN'S Q
Industry Fixed Effects
M OD-12 s
MOD-13
0.5892
0.1618
(2.31)*
(0.91)
-0.6775
-0.1404
(-2.04)*
(-0.61)
0.4386
0.2738
(2.38)*
(1.63)§
-0.0705
(-5.45)*
0.0087
(4.16)*
0.0007
(2.13)*
0.7780
(14.40)*
0.0674
(2.28)*
4.1316
(4.67)*
0.0554
(2.35)*
0.0261
(1.40)
-0.0005
(-2.79)*

MOD-14
0.5460
(2.37)*
-0.6140
(- 2 . 11)*

(0.07)
12.2702

0.3689
(2.21)*
-0.0697
(-5.44)*
0.0086
(4.15)*
0.0007
(2 .11)*
0.7764
(14.38)*
0.0678
(2.29)*
4.1211
(4.66)*
0.0553
(2.34)*
0.0258
(1.39)
-0.0005
(-2.79)*
0.0018
(0.13)
12.2083

(2.88)*

(2 .86)*

0.1964
(5.13)*
0.4109
(7.11)*
0.3565
(11.26)*
0.2455
0.00
0.00
Yes
7305

0.1973
(5.16)*
0.4111
(7.10)*
0.3567
(11.26)*
0.2458
0.00
0.00
Yes
7305

0.0010

0.0389
0.00
0.00
Yes
7329

Notes:

Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are in Parentheses. Standard Errors are calculated using
White's heteroskedasticity consistent variance-covariance matrix.
* indicates significance at 5 percent level, ** indicates significance a t 10 percent level, § indicates
significance a t 15 percent level.
# for models P-value of Joint exclusion test o f insider ownership is given; for which the null hypothesis is
all the insider-ownership variables are jointly Zero.
@ Model-11 is the replication ofSarkar and Sarkar's (2005) i.e., [0-0.25] & above.
$ Model-12 is adopted following India's Corporate Law or Legal regime where certain control rights
devolve at [0-0.26], [0.26-0.51] and above.
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Table IV
Determinants of Firm Value: Instrumental Variable Estimation
VARIABLE

INS
INSSQ
INSCU
LN(S)
LN(S)2
Y/S
LEV
LEVSQ
R&D/K
ADV/K
I/K
K/S
LN(AGE)
LIQUIDITY
FORPRES
FORS:26-51%
FORS>51%
BSE 500
Adj. R-square
F Stat: Prob > F
Year dummy:
Obs.
Mstrumented
Instruments
Tests of Endogeneity:
a)Wu-Hausman F
test:Prob>F:
b)Durbin-Wu-Hausman
chi-sq test: Prob>chi-sq:

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TOBIN'S Q
IV-2SLS R egression
EC2SLS (Baltagi, 1995)
MOD-15_______________ ^ D - 1 6
MOD-17
MOD-18
0.8544
0.8539
1.0455
1.0041
(1.87)*
(1.87)*
(2.05)*
(1.83)*
-2.2376
-2.2443
-2.9301
-2.9025
(-2.17)*
(-2.18)*
(-2.51)*
(-2.31)*
1.8340
1.8445
2.3610
2.3759
(2.61)*
(2.62)*
(2.94)*
(2.75)*
-0.0742
-0.0744
-0.0545
-0.0506
(-8.88)*
(-8.89)*
(-6.52)*
(-5.84)*
0.0083
0.0083
0.0061
0.0059
(6.61)*
(6.61)*
(4.50)*
(4.18)*
0.0008
0.0008
0.0005
0.0004
( 1.57)%
(1.57)§
( 1 .21 )
(1.14)
0.8131
0.8134
0.6599
0.6327
(17.71)*
(17.70)*
(13.60)*
(12.61)*
0.0663
0.0663
0.0740
0.0709
(4.01)*
(4.00)*
(4.22)*
(3.95)*
4.4174
4.4141
3.4602
3.0412
(11.60)*
(11.59)*
(9.11)*
(7.99)*
0.0481
0.0482
0.0362
0.0327
(2.98)*
(2.98)*
(2.13)*
(1.89)*
0.0268
0.0267
0.0266
0.0239
(1.24)
(1.24)
(1.55)§
(l-47)§
-0.0005
-0.0005
-0.0003
-0.0003
(-2.90)*
(-2.91)*
(-1.81)**
(-1.63)**
0.0106
0.0110
-0.0272
-0.0299
(0.75)
(0.77)
(-1.64)**
(-1.68)**
14.4518
14.4243
12.5301
11.1789
(8 .21 )*
(8.19)*
(7.76)*
(7.03)*
0.1908
(5.15)*
0.3861
(10.19)*
0.3743

0.1905
(5.14)*
0.3857
(10.17)*
0.3745

0.1418
(3.50*
0.3447
(8.03)*
0.4051

0.2689
0.00
Yes
5476
Ins, Inssq, Inscu
L.ins, L.inssq, L.inscu

0.2526 (overall)
Prob > chi2:0.00
Yes
5476
Ins, Inssq, Inscu
L.ins, L.inssq, L.inscu

a)0.2628

0.2690
0.00
Yes
5471
Ins, Inssq, Inscu
L.ins, L.inssq,
L.inscu,Beta,Se
a)0.21327

b) 0.2578

b) 0.20861

0.1199
(2 .86 )*

0.3282
(7.29)*
0.4086
(11.55)*
0.2499 (overall)
Prob > chi2;0.00
Yes
5471
Ins, Inssq, Inscu
L.ins, L.inssq,
L.inscu,Beta,Se

Notes:
t-statistics are in Parentheses in model 15 & 16 and z-statistics are in parenthesis in model 17 & 18.
* indicates significance a t 5 percent level, ** indicates significance at 10 percent level, § indicates
significance a t 15 percent level.
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Disentaneline the Performance and Entrenchment Effect... (Pattanayak)
Appendix 1
Description of Variables

Variables

Abbreviation

Definition
Performance Measures

Tobin's Q

Tobin's Q or Q
Ratio

(M arket Value of Equity + Preference Capital+ Total
Borrowing)/Book Value of Assets

Insider'
Ownership Share

INS

Share of founding fam ily/insider. In the estimation, it is
used in a 0 to 1 Scale

Square o f Insider
Share

INSSQ

Square of Insider Share i.e., (INS)^

Cube of Insider
Share

INSCU

Power three of Insider Share i.e., (INS)^

First Spline o f
Insider Share

INS.SPl

Unless otherwise M entioned, it is up to 0.20

Second Spline of
Insider Share

INS.SP2

Unless otherwise M entioned, it is up to 0.49

Third Spline o f
Insider Share

INS.SP3

Unless otherwise M entioned, above 0.49

Foreign Presence

FORPRES

A categorical Variable, that is, equal to 1 if there is
foreign Promoter share w ithin Prom oter/Insider Share, 0
otherwise.

Foreign Share<26%

FORS<26%

A categorical Variable, that is, equal to 1 if foreign
Promoter share w ithin PromoterAnsider Share is less
than 0.26, 0 otherwise.

Foreign Share
between 26% to
51%

FORS:26-51%

A categorical Variable, that is, equal to 1 if foreign
Promoter share w ithin Prom oter/Insider Share is more
than or equal to 0.26 and less than 0.51, 0 otherwise.

Foreign Share>51%

FORS:>51%

A categorical Variable, that is, equal to 1 if foreign
Promoter share w ithin Prom oter/Insider Share is more
than or equal to 0.51, 0 otherwise.
Other Variables of Interest

Sales, Sales Square

LN(Sh LN(Sy

I) N atural Logarithm of Sales. II) N atural Logarithm of
Sales Square
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Operating Income

Y/S

Cash Profit/Sales.(Cash Profit: This is the profit derived
by adding the non cash charges such as depreciation and
am ortization to the profit after tax.)

Leverage, Leverage
Square

LEV, LEVSQ

Unless otherw ise stated, It is Long term
Borrowings/Total Assets (To avoid sim ultaneity and
endogeneity, we have taken one period lag of Leverage)

Research &
Development

R&DIK

Aggregate Research and D evelopm ent
Expenditure/Gross Fixed Assets

Selling

ADV/K

(A dvertising Exp. +Marketing Exp. +Distribution
Exp.)/Gross Fixed Assets

Capital
Expenditure or
Investment

UK

Expenditure in Acquiring New Fixed Assets/Gross Fixed
Assets

Capital Intensity

K/S

Gross Fixed Assets/ Sales

Age

LN(AGE)

N atural Logarithm of Age.(Age=2004 - Year of
Incorporation)

Liquidity

Liquidity

365 days Average Trade quantity of Stocks/Total Shares
outstanding

BSE 500

BSE 500

A categorical Variable, that is, equal to 1 if the Firm
belongs to BSE-500 list, 0 otherwise.

B e ta (fi)

Beta

Estimated Beta Coefficient

SE (S.E ^)

Se

Standard Error of Beta
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Appendix 2
Shareholding levels and authority
SHAREHOLDING

AUTHORITY

< 10 %

Can prevent acts which are ultra vires the co. or illegal. Can approach Central
Govt, to sue m anagem ent for oppression of m inority shareholders or
m ism anagem ent of the co.

> 10 %

Can sue managem ent for oppression of m inority shareholders &
m ism anagem ent of the co.

> 25 %

Can block special resolutions -the passing of w hich requires prior notice to be
given to members, and votes cast in favor be at least 3 times the votes cast
against.

> 50 %

Can pass an ordinary resolution — which govern m ost m atters and inter alia
covers:
>

adopting the annual accounts

>

matters relating to the capital structure of the company

>

issues relating to the appointm ent of auditors and their rem uneration

>
issues relating to the appointm ent of directors including the managing
director, their rem uneration and perm ission for exercise of certain powers
>
>75%

100%

matters associated w ith the voluntary w inding up of a company

Can pass a special resolution, some of the decisions requiring which are:
>

Change in the m em orandum and articles of association of the co.

>

Approval for the commencement of a new business

>

Alteration of the rights of holders of special classes of shares

>

Specific issues in the w inding u p of a co.

Total control of the company

Source: Rao and Biswal (2003)

